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**Appendix: Concerning the meaning of λεγόμενος (Section 1 above).**

a) First, the grammatical information: Raphael Kühner-Bernhard Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, II:1 (1898; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966), p. 271 (note to §404): “The participles λεγόμενος and καλούμενος are used as Latin: *qui dicitur, vocatur; quem dicunt, vocant*, etc., and German: *so genannt*.” One observes that Kühner-Gerth write ‘*so genannt*’ separately, which, according to German orthographic rules, means that “what is signified is primarily the activity”; thus, here, the activity of naming (*Der Grosse Duden, Rechtschreibung der deutschen Sprache* [Mannheim: Dudenverlag, 1967], vol. 1, p. 43, orthographische Regel R 142). Due to the adjectival application bound to it, the devaluing meaning would require the non-separated form: Duden (*ibid.*). The examples quoted show that Kühner-Gerth suggest the ‘objective’ meaning: “Hdt. 6, 61, ἐν τῇ Θεράπνῃ καλομένη, i.e., *urbe, quae Therapne vocatur*. Th. 1, 112 τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον. X. Comm. 1, 1, 11 ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος. Hier. 1.31. Pl. Civ. 493d ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη *Diomedea quae dicitur necessitas*.”

b) Some examples from Aristotle: It should be clear that Aristotle in *An. Po.* A 19, 81b14 αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι ὑποθέσεις does not talk about ‘so-called’, thus somehow spurious or useless, hypotheses, and that in *Meteor.* A 3, 339b5 τὰ λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων he does not mean the ‘so-called’ but the actual elements, just as a little above (b3) τὸν καλούμενον ἀέρα where he means the actual air. From *Part. An.* III 3, 665a9: μηχανησαμένη (sc. ἡ φύσις) τὴν καλουμένην ἐπιγλωττίδα we should not conclude that nature for Aristotle created a merely ‘so-called’ epiglottis. In the same context (665a13) we find that perception and movement are directed ἐπὶ τὸ καλούμενον ἔμπροσθεν, thus, “in the direction *which we term forward*” (so goes the translation by W. Ogle in *The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. J. Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], I 1036). *EN* X 7, 1177a27 ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη—here, at the culmination of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle by no means speaks of a merely ‘so-called’ autarchy (to this point see Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, trans. F. Dirlmeier [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969], p. 231: “that which one calls self-sufficing independence [Autarchy]”). In addition, when in *Ath. pol.* 55, 1 we read καλούμενοι ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, it is not necessary to bring to mind any usurpers, who unjustly had themselves called “the nine archons,” but rather the actual Athenian archons. Aristotle’s οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι (*Met.* A 5, 985b23) were indeed known as the “so-called Pythagoreans”; however, W.K.C. Guthrie was right when he re-translated it as “those who are called Pythagoreans,” and thereby expressly warned against the translation ‘so-called’ (*A History of Greek Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962], vol. 1, p. 155n. 1: “It is important to avoid translating the word καλούμενοι as ‘so-called’, for it carries none of the implications of spuriousness which the English phrase suggests”).

Naturally, one can encounter in Aristotle the ironic-devaluing meaning. In some cases one might even doubt which meaning is suitable, as in *Met.* B 3, 998a7 τὰ μεταξύ ταῦτα λεγόμενα.



<b>Timaios</b> 1	53 d6-7	τάς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἄνωθεν θεὸς οἶδεν καὶ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνῳ φίλος ἦ
2	48 c2-6	νῦν δὲ οὖν τό γε παρ' ἡμῶν ὧδε ἐχέτω· τὴν μὲν περὶ πάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ τούτων περὶ τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δι' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα
3	28 c3-5	τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν
<b>Sophistes</b> 4	254 b3-4	Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ἦ·
5	254 c1-8	μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἅττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν εἰ μὴ πάση σαφηνεῖα δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γινώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως
<b>Politikos</b> 6	262 c 3-7	Πειρατέον ἔτι σαφέστερον φράζειν εὐνοία τῆς σῆς φύσεως, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ μὲν οὖν παρεστηκότι τὰ νῦν δηλῶσαι μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἀδύνατον· ἐπιχειρητέον δέ τι καὶ σμικρῷ πλέον αὐτὸ προαγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σαφηνεῖας ἕνεκα
7	284 b9 – c1	οὕτω καὶ νῦν τὸ πλέον αὖ καὶ ἔλαττον μετρητὰ προσαναγκαστέον γίνεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν
8	284 c6 – d3	ΞΕ. Πλέον, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔτι τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἢ κείνο — καίτοι κάκεινου γε μεμνήμεθα τὸ μῆκος ὅσον ἦν — ἀλλ' ὑποτίθεσθαι μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μάλα δίκαιον. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΞΕ. Ὡς ποτε δεήσει τοῦ νῦν λεχθέντος πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ νῦν καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς δείκνυται
<b>Parmenides</b> 9	136 d6 – e3	εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν.
10	136 b7 – c5	ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν