eng URI http://hdl.handle.net/10795/3208 αγορά πολιτική τιμών τηλεπικοινωνία παροχέας πρόσβασης This paper compares the impact of retail price discrimination and uniform pricing on a monopolist’s incentives to extend its Next Generation Access (NGA) network deployment to less densely populated geographic areas. It is found that geographic price discrimination provides the monopolist with higher incentives to deploy a larger NGA network. In addition, geographic price discrimination results in better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment cost is not extremely low. In such cases, the regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate since the monopolist chooses the socially optimal pricing regime. 11 pp. LOMv1.0 creator LOMv1.0 Scientific Coordinator LOMv1.0 Project Executing Organisation 2013 Digital Library of the Operational Programme "Education and Lifelong Learning" abstract types Text Geographic markets Investment incentives Next generation access networks Price discrimination Social welfare 229804 application/pdf http://repository.edulll.gr/edulll/bitstream/10795/3208/2/3208_1.46_%ce%91%ce%9d_1_9_13.pdf URI http://hdl.handle.net/10795/3208 LOMv1.0creator 2016-05-18T10:37:45Z LOMv1.0validator 2016-05-18T10:37:45Z LOMv1.0 gre no no Copyright EYD-EPEDBM (Operational Programme "Education and Lifelong Learning")